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Abstract 
Understanding how individuals revise their political beliefs has important implications for 
society. In a pre-registered study (N=900) we experimentally separated the predictions of 
two leading theories of human belief revision—desirability bias and confirmation bias—in 
the context of the 2016 US presidential election. Participants indicated who they desired to 
win, and who they believed would win, the election. Following confrontation with evidence 
that was either consistent or inconsistent with their desires or beliefs, they again indicated 
who they believed would win. We observed a robust desirability bias—individuals updated 
their beliefs more if the evidence was consistent (versus inconsistent) with their desired 
outcome. This bias was independent of whether the evidence was consistent or inconsistent 
with their prior beliefs. In contrast, we find limited evidence of an independent confirmation 
bias in belief updating. These results have implications for the relevant psychological 
theories and for political belief revision in practice. 
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Introduction 
 People are routinely exposed to a bewildering array of information relevant to their 
political beliefs.  Whether and how they incorporate this information has profound 
consequences for society. The belief that vaccines have harmful side effects (Moritz, 2011), 
or that climate change is a hoax (Lewandowsky et al., 2013), can reduce people’s intentions 
to vaccinate (Gangarosa et al., 1998; Jolley & Douglas, 2014a; Horne et al., 2015), or to 
minimize their carbon footprint (Douglas & Sutton, 2015; Jolley & Douglas, 2014b). Even 
simple infographics displayed during live televised election debates can meaningfully shape 
beliefs about debate outcome, potentially influencing the voting intentions of millions of 
viewers (Davis et al., 2011). A clear understanding of how people incorporate information 
into their political beliefs is thus of considerable practical importance. 
 Two prominent theories offer similar yet distinct predictions regarding when and 
how people incorporate new information into their beliefs. One theory contends that 
individuals assign greater weight to information that is desirable versus undesirable—i.e., a 
desirability bias. This bias is reported to underlie an asymmetry whereby people update 
their prior beliefs to incorporate new and desirable information more than new but 
undesirable information (Sharot & Garrett, 2016). The other theory, confirmation bias, 
contends that people preferentially search for, evaluate and incorporate new information 
that confirms their prior beliefs (Nickerson, 1998). This bias is reported to underlie an 
asymmetry whereby people update their prior beliefs to incorporate new and confirming 
information more than new but disconfirming information—even if they receive a balanced 
set of both types of information (Lord et al., 1979; Taber & Lodge, 2006; Taber et al., 2009).  
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Unfortunately, the predictions of desirability bias and confirmation bias are often 
conflated. In the domain of self-belief, the tendency for people to believe desirable things 
about themselves and their futures (Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Weinstein, 1980) means that 
new information is typically either confirming and desirable, or disconfirming and 
undesirable (Eil & Rao, 2011). In the domain of political belief, rigorous separation of 
desirable and confirming information is similarly difficult. Of the few experiments that are 
appropriately designed to disentangle them, group identity is taken as a proxy for the 
desirability of information—that is, whether the information is consistent (i.e., desirable) or 
inconsistent (undesirable) with the position of an individual’s cultural group—and belief 
updating is not the target outcome measure (e.g., see Kahan, 2016a; 2016b).  
Here we experimentally separated desirability bias and confirmation bias in political 
belief updating.  To do so, we capitalized on the political context prior to the 2016 US 
presidential election. To illustrate the advantage of this context, consider that many 
supporters of candidate Donald Trump may have believed Hillary Clinton would win the 
election—owing to her establishment support (Green & Kapur, 2016) or, more 
conspiratorially, a rigged ballot (Graham, 2016). In such circumstances, new information 
may have been simultaneously confirming but undesirable—for instance, polls indicating a 
Clinton win—or disconfirming but desirable—polls indicating a Trump win: causing 
desirability bias and confirmation bias to yield divergent predictions for belief updating.  
We exploited the profusion of close polling results1 to credibly suggest to individuals 
that either Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton would become the next president, and 
                                                             
1 At the time of study (data collection commenced 26th September 2016); see 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/us/general_election_trump_vs_clinton-5491.html 
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measured how individuals with congruent (i.e., same candidate) desire-belief profiles, and 
incongruent (different candidate) desire-belief profiles updated their beliefs following 
receipt of this information. We thus independently manipulated whether information was 
consistent or inconsistent with (a) who individuals desired to win the election, or (b) who 
they believed would win the election. 
Methods 
Participants 
 We collected data from 900 participants online via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (59% 
female; Mage = 37.89 SD = 12.91). Participants were US residents as determined by IP 
address (IP addresses located outside of the US were blocked prior to the start of the 
experiment). We required 779 participants to attain greater than 80% power (α = .05) to 
detect a small effect of partial eta squared (ηp²) = .01 in our primary analyses of covariance. 
We added approximately 15% to this number to guard against power loss due to planned 
data exclusions. Following these data exclusions, we retained 811 participants for analyses. 
The study hypotheses, design, data collection, and analysis plan were pre-registered (see 
https://aspredicted.org/idxgj.pdf). 
Procedure & design 
 At the beginning of the survey, participants completed a brief screening 
questionnaire designed to determine who they (a) desired to win, and (b) believed would 
win the 2016 US presidential election. Responses to (a) were provided in a nominal choice 
format: Participants selected “Donald Trump”, “Hillary Clinton”, or “neither”. Responses to 
(b) were provided on a bipolar sliding scale from 0-100 with “Hillary Clinton” (0) at one end, 
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and “Donald Trump” (100) at the other (the numerical values were hidden from 
participants). Participants were instructed that the more confident they were that a 
candidate would win, the closer they should slide the pointer to that candidate’s name. 
Those who responded with scores greater than 50 were categorized as believing Trump 
would win, and scores less than 50 as believing Clinton would win. Participants selecting 
“neither” for (a), or exactly 50 for (b), were directed to an end-of-survey message and were 
unable to continue. This yielded two quasi-experimental groups; those whose desire-believe 
candidates were congruent, and those whose desire-believe candidates were incongruent. 
We balanced these condition assignments to obtain approximately 450 in each quasi-
experimental condition (final condition samples after data exclusions: congruent desire-
belief: n=406 [desireTrump/believeTrump: n=127, desireClinton/believeClinton: n=279]; incongruent 
desire-belief: n=405 [desireClinton/believeTrump: n=91, desireTrump/believeClinton: n=314])2.  
Participants in both conditions then completed a filler task (the 16-item Balanced 
Inventory of Desirable Responding; Hart et al., 2015) before being randomly presented with 
evidence either consistent, or inconsistent, with who they believed would win the election. 
Specifically, participants read a short passage about nationwide polling results, which 
emphasized either that Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump was likely to win the upcoming 
election. Participants were also presented with a bar graph figure illustrating such an 
outcome (study materials are available in the Materials Supplement). Evidence presentation 
was balanced within each specific candidate that participants initially believed would win 
the election. For example, of those participants who initially believed Trump would win, half 
                                                             
2 The substantial variance in condition sizes per candidate reflects the fact that approximately three-quarters 
of our sample initially believed Clinton would win (see Figure 1 in the results section)—explaining the smaller 
number of individuals in the “believeTrump” condition(s). 
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received the polling manipulation suggesting Clinton would win, and half received the 
polling manipulation suggesting Trump would win (likewise for those who initially believed 
Clinton would win). Thus, collapsing over specific candidates, this yielded four between-
subjects conditions in a 2 x 2 design: Evidence consistent or inconsistent with who the 
participant initially believed would win (Confirmation: Confirmatory or Disconfirmatory) and 
consistent or inconsistent with who they desired to win (Desirability: Desirable or 
Undesirable). Following the evidence presentation participants responded to several filler 
questions about polling data—e.g., “To what extent have you been following the polling 
data for the upcoming US presidential election?”—before again indicating who they believed 
would win the election, on the same bipolar scale used initially. 
Belief updating 
 We calculated how much participants updated their confidence in who they believed 
would win the election in the following steps. First, we converted both the participants’ 
initial confidence (T1), and their subsequent confidence (T2), onto a comparable scale 
indicating the absolute confidence they had in the candidate they initially believed was most 
likely to win. Thus, for those who initially believed Trump would win we subtracted 50 from 
T1 and T2 scores, whereas for those who initially believed Clinton would win we subtracted 
T1 and T2 scores from 50. Next, we computed the absolute difference between these newly 
converted T1 and T2 scores for each participant. Finally, we multiplied this difference by 
either 1 (if the participant updated towards the presented evidence) or -1 (if the participant 
updated away from the presented evidence); meaning that higher numbers represented 
greater belief updating towards the presented evidence. 
Results 
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Data exclusions 
 Participants were excluded from all analyses for fulfilling one or more of the pre-
registered criteria: Failing an attention check embedded in the filler task (n=22, 2.44% of 
sample), answering “yes” to a question asking them if they responded dishonestly or 
mistakenly during the survey (n=48, 5.33%), or recording a belief update score of greater 
than the mean ± 3SD in their respective condition (n=26, 2.89%). We excluded 1 (0.11%) 
further participant for taking the survey more than once (identified via their unique Amazon 
Mechanical Turk ID). Following these exclusions, 811 participants were retained for 
analyses. 
Descriptives 
 Figure 1 displays the proportion of participants reporting who they (a) desired to win 
and (b) initially believed would win the election (for these results split by gender, age group 
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Figure 1. Percentage of participants reporting which candidate they (a) desired to win and 
(b) initially believed would win the 2016 US presidential election. N=811. 
 
Pre-registered analyses 
 We conducted an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to investigate the effect of 
Desirability and Confirmation factors on belief updating, adjusting for absolute T1 
confidence scores3 (Figure 2 displays the adjusted mean update in each condition4). There 
was a main effect of Desirability: F (1, 806) = 32.81, p <.001, ηp² = .04 90% CI [0.02, 0.06], 
such that participants updated more towards the evidence when it was consistent (versus 
inconsistent) with the candidate they desired to win. There was also a main effect of 
Confirmation: F (1, 806) = 76.63, p <.001, ηp² = .09 [0.06, 0.12], but in this case participants 
updated more towards the evidence when it was inconsistent (versus consistent) with the 
candidate they initially believed would win. In other words, we observed a disconfirmation 
bias. Finally, we observed a small interaction between Desirability and Confirmation: F (1, 
806) = 7.15, p = .008, ηp² = .01 [0.00, 0.02]. To decompose this interaction, we conducted 





                                                             
3 This prevents regression to the mean spuriously affecting belief updating. 
4 The raw means and distributions of update scores are reported in the Analysis Supplement. 











Figure 2. Mean update by condition. Error bars and parentheses denote standard error of the 
mean. Note: Means are adjusted for absolute T1 confidence and based on the 2x2 ANCOVA 
model. One unit of update corresponds to a 1% adjustment on the bipolar scale used to 
measure belief.  N=811. 
 
 For those participants receiving disconfirming information, updating was greater if 
that information was desirable (versus undesirable): F (1, 407) = 36.58, p <.001, ηp² = .08 
90% CI [0.04, 0.13]. This pattern was the same for those receiving confirming information, 
albeit less pronounced: F (1, 398) = 20.62, p <.001, ηp² = .05 [0.02, 0.09]. Next we examined 
those participants who received undesirable information—updating was greater for 
disconfirming (versus confirming) information: F (1, 406) = 23.76, p <.001, ηp² = .06 [0.02, 
0.09]. This disconfirmation pattern was the same, yet more pronounced, for those receiving 
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desirable information: F (1, 399) = 47.72, p <.001, ηp² = .11 [0.06, 0.16]. Finally, directly 
comparing the unique effect of desirable information (disconfirming-desirable condition) 
against the unique effect of confirming information (confirming-undesirable condition) 
revealed that updating was greater for the former: F (1, 402) = 75.26, p <.001, ηp² = .16 
[0.11, 0.21].  
In the following sections, we report a series of exploratory analyses to examine (a) 
the robustness of our results, and (b) extant debates in the field of politically motivated 
cognition. 
Robustness 
 Prior exposure. It is likely that participants had different amounts of prior exposure 
to the election polls. Examination of the distribution of one of our filler questions— “To 
what extent have you been following the polling data for the upcoming US presidential 
election?”—suggested this was the case (see Figure S4 in the Analysis Supplement). It is 
possible this affected our manipulation and subsequent results. We thus repeated our pre-
registered ANCOVA with the addition of this variable as a covariate. However, the pattern of 
results remained the same. 
Initial confidence. Participants’ initial (T1) confidence scores were negatively 
skewed—in particular, a substantial number reported complete (or strong) confidence in 
their initial belief regarding which candidate would win (see Figure 3). This constrains belief 
updating for those receiving confirming information because they are unable to update 
towards the new information (i.e., increase their confidence). In contrast, those receiving 
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disconfirming information can update towards the new information (i.e., decrease their 










Figure 3. Distribution of absolute T1 confidence in belief about which candidate would win 
the election. Note: The dashed line denotes the median. N=811. 
 
To explore this possibility, we selected a subset of participants (N = 370)—excluding 
those with high initial confidence (absolute T1 confidence scores > 25, Nexcluded = 441)—and 
recomputed the mean update in each condition (Figure 4 displays the results). The pattern 
of means in this truncated sample indicated a diminished disconfirmation bias, but an 
enduring desirability bias. To confirm this statistically we conducted separate Kruskal-Wallis 
                                                             
5 We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers for emphasizing this point. 
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tests on the distribution of belief updating in the Confirmation and Desirability conditions, 
respectively6. As suspected, there was now only a trivial difference in updating for 
participants who received disconfirmatory (Median = 2.01, IQR = 11.69) versus confirmatory 
(Median = 1.78, IQR = 6.58) information: χ² (1, N = 370) = 2.01, p =.156. In contrast, 
participants receiving desirable information updated more (Median = 3.08, IQR = 11.61) 
than those receiving undesirable information (Median = 0.71, IQR = 6.16): χ² (1, N = 370) = 










Figure 4. Mean update by condition following sample truncation. Error bars and parentheses 
denote standard error of the mean. Note: Means are unadjusted. One unit of update 
corresponds to a 1% adjustment on the bipolar scale used to measure belief.  N=370. 
                                                             
6 Parametric analyses were inappropriate as the cell N’s across conditions were unequal following sample 
truncation. 
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To supplement this analysis, we also specifically examined updating among those 
with weak confidence in their initial belief. This is worthwhile because participants with 
particularly low confidence may have been (a) less constrained by the upper limit of the 
confidence scale, or (b) simply more receptive to confirming information, compared to their 
higher confidence counterparts. Thus, we selected those participants with low confidence 
(absolute T1 confidence scores ≤ 12.5, Nexcluded = 622) and again recomputed the mean 
update in each condition. Because the resultant N was small (Nlow-confidence = 189) and 
unevenly distributed across conditions, we simulated belief updating scores using the 
parameters from the low confidence sample. Specifically, for each of the four conditions, we 
drew 500 scores from a random normal distribution centred on the respective condition 
mean, and the pooled SD (i.e., computed across the four conditions) (the simulation script 
and data are available in the Simulation Supplement).  
This simulated sample conferred greater than 99% power to detect small effects (ηp² 
= 0.01,  = 0.05). Conducting an ANOVA on this data revealed a main effect of Desirability, F 
(1, 1996) = 53.73, p <.001, ηp² = .03 90% CI [0.02, 0.04], similar in size and equivalent in 
direction to that observed in the preceding empirical analyses. The main effect of 
Confirmation was trivial in size, F (1, 1996) = 2.06, p =.151, ηp² = .001 [0.000, 0.005], as was 
the interaction between the two factors, F (1, 1996) = 1.54, p =.215, ηp² = .001 [0.000, 
0.004].  
Ideological Asymmetry Hypothesis 
 There is ongoing debate over whether motivated cognition is more pronounced 
among individuals on the political right than the political left (Jost et al., 2003; Kahan, 
2016b). We thus explored whether supporters of Donald Trump demonstrated greater 
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desirability bias than supporters of Hillary Clinton. We conducted an ANCOVA (adjusting for 
absolute T1 confidence as before) with two factors: Desirability, and a dummy coded 
variable denoting which candidate the participant desired to win (“Supporter”). There was a 
small Desirability by Supporter interaction, F (1, 806) = 8.58, p =.004, ηp² = .01 90% CI [0.00, 
0.03]. Separate ANCOVA models revealed a stronger desirability bias among supporters of 
Donald Trump, F (1, 438) = 34.07, p <.001, ηp² = .07 [0.04, 0.11], than supporters of Hillary 
Clinton, F (1, 367) = 2.54, p =.112, ηp² = .01 [0.00, 0.03].  
Further exploration, however, revealed this asymmetry was due to the previously 
identified ceiling effect in initial (T1) confidence. First, a large number of participants 
supported Clinton and also believed she would win (n=279)—whereas fewer than half this 
number supported Trump while also believing he would win (n=127). Second, these 
participants (i.e., those with congruent desire and prior belief) had strong negative skew in 
their initial confidence, with many believing that their desired candidate was certain to win 
(see Figure S5 in the Analysis Supplement). Taking these facts together implies that 
supporters of Clinton were more numerous among those who received desirable 
information but were constrained (by virtue of their extreme initial confidence) in updating 
their belief towards this information.  
This was confirmed by examining participants who (i) had a congruent desire-belief 
profile, (ii) received desirable information, and (iii) reported extreme initial confidence 
(absolute T1 confidence > 45). Of these participants (n=69), 67% supported Clinton (n=46) 
and 33% supported Trump (n=23). This discrepancy may have disproportionately 
suppressed desirability bias among Clinton supporters. Indeed, truncating the sample to 
exclude those with extreme initial confidence (absolute T1 confidence > 45, Nexcluded = 192, 
BIAS IN POLITICAL BELIEF REVISION     16 
 
Nincluded = 619), and repeating the ANCOVA analysis, diminished the size of the Desirability by 
Supporter interaction, F (1, 614) = 1.08, p =.298, ηp² = .002 90% CI [0.000, 0.012]. Supporters 
of Donald Trump and supporters of Hillary Clinton demonstrated similar desirability bias in 
this sample: F (1, 348) = 27.19, p <.001, ηp² = .07 [0.03, 0.12] and F (1, 265) = 10.55, p =.001, 
ηp² = .04 [0.01, 0.08], respectively. 
Discussion 
 Understanding how people revise their political beliefs has important implications 
for society. In the context of the 2016 US presidential election, we observed a robust 
desirability bias: individuals incorporated information more if it was consistent (versus 
inconsistent) with their desired outcome. This bias was independent of whether the 
information was consistent or inconsistent with individuals’ prior beliefs. In contrast, we 
found limited evidence of an independent confirmation bias in belief updating. These results 
have implications for the underlying psychological theories and for political belief revision in 
practice. 
 A substantial body of work spanning neuroscience, economics, and clinical 
psychology reports an asymmetry in the updating of self-beliefs whereby desirable 
information is incorporated more than undesirable information. This asymmetry has been 
observed when individuals receive information about their personality traits (Korn et al., 
2016; Korn et al., 2012), abilities and attractiveness (Eil & Rao, 2011; Mobius et al., 2011), or 
risk of experiencing future negative life events (Moutsiana et al., 2013; Sharot et al., 2011; 
but see Shah et al., 2016; Garret & Sharot, in press). A similar yet distinct asymmetry has 
been reported in the updating of political beliefs whereby individuals become more 
confident in their prior beliefs despite receiving a balanced set of confirming and 
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disconfirming information. When two individuals with conflicting prior beliefs are thus 
exposed to the same stream of information, polarization of political beliefs is an oft-
observed outcome (e.g., Lord et al., 1979; Taber & Lodge, 2006; Taber et al., 2009).  
The present study advances this work twofold. First, we find a robust asymmetry in 
political belief updating that is consistent with desirability bias, independent of individuals’ 
prior beliefs. In contrast, we find little independent effect of prior beliefs on belief updating. 
This suggests that the belief polarization reported in previous studies may be due to 
individuals’ conflicting desires, not their prior beliefs per se. Second, whereas past 
investigations of political belief updating have mainly focused on political attitudes (e.g., 
support for or against a policy), here we examined belief updating about political reality—
specifically, individuals’ belief about which presidential candidate was going to be elected. 
Though one might expect biased belief updating in the former case—after all, attitudes are 
guided by preferences and desires—it is somewhat more surprising to find that individuals’ 
desires biased their belief updating over a question of fact (Kahan, 2016a).  
 A recent study reported that individuals updated their beliefs about the facts of 
global warming asymmetrically, but that the specific pattern depended upon whether they 
were weak or strong believers in anthropogenic climate change (Sunstein et al., 2016). 
Particularly, when confronted with new information regarding global temperature increase, 
strong believers updated their beliefs more upon receipt of ostensibly undesirable 
information (i.e., a faster temperature increase than expected), whereas weak believers 
updated their beliefs more upon receipt of ostensibly desirable information (a slower 
increase than expected). Though this pattern appears consistent with an independent 
confirmation bias, such an outcome may emerge when individuals are personally invested in 
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“being right”—indeed, for many climate change activists a belief that the world is warming 
constitutes a core part of their identity (Stern et al., 1999). For such people, objectively 
undesirable (but confirming) information about the rate of global warming may be 
subjectively desirable: vindicating their commitment to combatting climate change 
(Sunstein et al., 2016) and affirming their cultural group identity (Kahan et al., 2012).  
 It is unlikely that our design inadvertently conflated confirmation with desirability in 
this way. Ahead of an election, it is difficult to imagine an individual being personally 
invested in the belief that their desired candidate would not get into office. Indeed, in the 
domain of self-belief updating, rigorous separation of confirming and desirable information 
yields identical results to those reported in the present study—namely, a robust desirability 
bias but limited evidence of confirmation bias (Eil & Rao, 2011). We note the important 
distinction, however, between (a lack of) confirmation bias observed in belief updating as 
measured here, and confirmation bias observed in measures of information search and 
evaluation (e.g., Ditto & Lopez, 1992). We did not directly examine the latter, which may yet 
manifest independent of information desirability. Additional exploration of our own data 
lent support to this distinction (see “informational value of polls” available in the Analysis 
Supplement).  
 Finally, our results offer a mechanistic explanation for why impassioned political 
disagreements in the US, such as those over gun control or immigration, appear increasingly 
polarized and intractable (Pew Research Center, 2016). Insofar as individuals have strong 
preferences concerning these issues (Koleva et al., 2012), our findings suggest they 
selectively incorporate new evidence into what they believe to be true regarding the 
relevant facts—provided it is consistent with what they desire to be true. Polarization over 
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factual beliefs is inimical to the effective functioning of democratic society (Kahan et al., 
2012); it is thus a priority to continue exploring which interventions ameliorate the 
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